Young People's Socialist League

(This article has been submitted for publication in the November-December 2008 issue of The Socialist, the bimonthly magazine of the Socialist Party.)

Georgia's ill-fated attempt to re-establish control over the de facto independent region of South Ossetia in August attracted long-overdue international attention to a long-festering conflict. Unfortunately, most views of the crisis were filtered through highly distorting lenses, shaped into narratives of a resurgent Russian empire re-subjugating its "near abroad", or imperialist Georgia assaulting the self-determination of its separatist minorities.

It's easy to take sides in the conflict in the Caucasus, since each side is guilty of serious crimes, from aggression and oppression to ethnic cleansing. All one has to do is focus on the crimes of the chosen enemy, while maintaining a discreet silence about those of the chosen friend.

As socialists, however, our approach should not be to align with any nation, but rather to consider the best ways working people can improve their situation, in the Caucasus as at home.

The situation is bleak, but not as hopeless as it may seem at first sight. While many casual observers are inclined to ascribe the conflict between the Georgians and Georgia's Abkhazian and Ossetian minorities to ancient and ineradicable ethnic hatreds, the real roots of the region's troubles are more recent, and more tangled.

Nationalism only emerged as a significant force in the ethnic patchwork of the Caucasus during the chaos of the 1917 Russian Revolution and subsequent civil war. The collapse of central authority and steady advance of Turkish armies fighting in the First World War pushed countries in the region to reluctant independence, which then sparked a burst of nationalist feeling. Nationalism became particularly intense in Georgia, which invaded and annexed Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 1918, fostering in turn the development of Abkhazian and Ossetian nationalisms in opposition to Georgia.

This led Abkhazians and Ossetians to support the 1921 Bolshevik uprising that brought Georgia into the Soviet Union, for which they were rewarded with privileged places in the USSR's ethno-federal structure. Although subjected to forced "Georgianization" under Stalin and Beria (both Georgians), in the relative normalcy of the post-Stalin period Abkhazia and South Ossetia regained limited autonomy as constituent parts of Georgia, and their titular nationalities received certain special privileges, in a sort of Soviet affirmative action.

As in the former Yugoslavia, ethnic nationalism flared up again as Communism collapsed and the Soviet Union dissolved. Georgians resented the perks awarded to Abkhazians and South Ossetians, and recalling the events of 1921, came to view them as pro-Russian fifth columnists. Coupled with Abkhazian and Ossetian fear of Georgian domination, this led to spiralling tensions that reached a boiling point as Georgia stripped the regions of their autonomy. In armed conflict during the early 1990s, Abkhazia and South Ossetia gained de facto independence, which they have retained to this day.

During the fighting, large numbers of ethnic Georgians, roughly 30% of the population of South Ossetia and nearly 50% that of Abkhazia, were forced to flee their homes, and most remain refugees. Recognition of the rights of these refugees makes it impossible to consider the conflict in the Caucasus as merely about the self-determination of oppressed minorities.

The continuing refugee crisis forms the central obstacle to a peaceful settlement of the conflict. In a very real sense, settlement of the conflict means resolution of the refugee issue. Short of full-fledged ethnic cleansing, this can only be accomplished by reconciliation between Abkhazians, Ossetians, and Georgians, and the construction of a democratic, multi-ethnic society.

This is why Russia's recent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries is deeply counter-productive. Done more to test the limits of Russian power in the post-Bush world than to actually improve the situation in the Caucasus, Russia's actions encourage a further hardening of attitudes on all sides, and obstruct the necessary rapprochement. They also treat Abkhazia and South Ossetia as pawns in a new manifestation of the "great power" politics that produced the Great Game of the 19th century and the Cold War of the 20th. This, of course, is exactly how many Western leaders are eager to think of the whole situation.

If the international community approaches the conflict through this "Russia-vs-the-West" framework, rather than recognizing and addressing its real roots, it can only foster deeper and longer-lasting ethnic strife.

This is where Socialists' emphasis on alignment not with nations, but with the working people of the world, can show its strength and play a positive role. A Socialist administration taking this approach would be able to assist in mediation, as a party interested only in the common good. Even in the opposition, we can help to focus the world's attention on the needs of people, away from crass considerations of profits and political games.

Reconciliation after more than 15 years of conflict is a tall order, but also the only path to lasting peace and justice. Progress towards this goal depends on recognition of the region's history, which gives cause for hope in addition to despair. We learn that nationalist hostilities have relatively recent origin, and that overcoming them is not impossible. Georgians, Ossetians and Abkhazians all lived together in the past and can do so again in the future, on the basis of the more stable foundation provided by a democratic society.